I. Introduction

The 1998 reforms opened up opportunities for Indonesia to build democracy for the country. Reforms have also opened new bankruptcy in resolving conflicts in Papua through new techniques. It is hoped that battle decisions can be reached without resorting to violence, now not with military security techniques. All Presidents were elected during the Reformation period, namely; President BJ Habibie, President Abdurrahman Wahid, President Megawati Soekarno Putri, President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and President Joko Widodo tried to apply humanist persuasive techniques in efforts to resolve conflicts in Papua. Several regulations can be categorized using humanist persuasive techniques, for example: First, revoking the popularity of Military Emergency Operations (DOM) among the generation of President BJ Habibie. Second, modifying the call of the Province of Irian Jaya to the Province of Papua on December 25, 2000. Third, a professional apology from the Government for the violation of Human Rights (HAM) which was addressed with the assistance of using the TNI. Fourth, allow the implementation of the Papuan Congress and the raising of the Morning Star flag among the generation of President Abdurrahman Wahid. Fifth, giving the popularity of Special Autonomy with the ratification of Law no. 21 of 2001 concerning Special Autonomy for the Province of Papua (Law No. 21 of 2001). Sixth, issuing Presidential Instruction No. 1 of 2003 concerning the Expansion of Papua Province Land.
which gave the handover to West Papua Province under President Megawati's generation. Seventh, establishing a Unit for the Acceleration of Development for Papua and West Papua (UP4B) which is fully based on Presidential Regulation no. sixty-six in 2011 among the generation of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. However, in reality, the procedures and regulations of the post-reform authorities mentioned above are no longer able to resolve the fighting in Papua. In fact, the fighting in Papua is getting more intense, increasing and turning more open. Groups on behalf of Papua are no longer monopolized with the help of the Free Papua Organization (OPM).

Many new groups have emerged, such as the Irian Jaya Community Reconciliation Forum, Team 10, and the Papuan Council, which are not necessarily the same as the demands for an independent Papua. The pressure to withdraw from the Republic of Indonesia is also growing, for example when President BJ Habibi interacted with Team 100 to determine the future of the Papuan state. Team 100 has expressed hope for an independent Papua. When President Abdurrahman Wahid continued the dialogue at the executive committee of the Papua Council. The Papuan People's Congress also expressed its desire for an independent and independent Papua. During the Reformation, most of the approaches to resolving the Papuan conflict were from the granting of special autonomy (Otsu) in the Megawati era, the establishment of a development acceleration unit in Papua in the SBY era, to the Jokowi era.

During this reform period, a security approach was also carried out, which lead to violence. In a series of domestic conflicts, the economic approach is inadequate to resolve long-standing conflicts. Implementing a security approach also cannot be the main basis for resolving conflicts. There are wounds and trauma due to violent conflict, and the nation must respond more wisely.

II. Review of Literature

2.1. Strategy and Strategic Management

Rationale for Strategy and Strategic Management The strategy put forward by Stephanie K. Marrus, quoted by Sukristono (200131), states: An organization that prepares ways or efforts to achieve these goals. In the same book, Hamel and Prahalad (200131) define a more specific strategy. What can happen, not what happens." Management according to Dyck and Neubert (2009), on the other hand, is the process of planning, organizing, managing, and controlling people and other organizational resources to achieve company goals effectively. There are four management functions. That is, 1. Plan 2. Organization 3. Guidance 4. Aime Heene and Sebastian (2010: 0910), while it is a management unit within an organization that is able to repeatedly create value and provide and expand its distribution to stakeholders and other stakeholders. Defined as a process. Strategic management has five tasks. 1. Develop a vision and mission 2. Set goals and objectives 3. Create a strategy to achieve your goals 4. Implement and execute a strategy 5. Evaluate strategy and direction. According to Koteen Salusu (2008: 104105), there are four types of strategies, as follows. 1. Corporate strategy (organizational strategy) 2. Program strategy (program strategy) 3. Resource support strategy 4. Institutional strategy. Strategic management has five tasks. 1. Develop a vision and mission 2. Set goals and objectives 3. Create a strategy to achieve your goals 4. Implement and execute a strategy 5. Evaluate strategy and direction. According to Koteen Salusu (2008: 104105), there are four types of strategies. as follows. 1. Corporate strategy (organizational strategy) 2. Program strategy (program strategy) 3. Resource support strategy 4. Institutional strategy. Strategic management has five tasks. 1. Develop a vision and mission 2. Set goals and objectives 3. Create a strategy to achieve your goals 4. Implement and execute a strategy 5. Evaluate strategy and direction.
2.2. Strategy Management

Strategy management according to David (2011) describes the "method". The best way to study and apply the strategic management process is to use a model. In the model, each model describes one type of process. According to Pierce and Robinson, strategic management is defined as "decision-making assets and actions that lead to the development and implementation of plans to achieve corporate goals." According to Kuncoro (2006:13), "strategic management can be seen as an interrelated process and consists of several successive phases". Hunger and Wheelen (2012:29) state that "strategic management is a collection of management decisions and long-term decision-making actions in a company". This includes environmental analysis (external and internal environment).

The higher the company's leverage, the company tends to generate less cash, this is likely to affect the occurrence of earning management. Companies with high debt or leverage ratios tend to hold their profits and prioritize the fulfillment of debt obligations first. According to Brigham and Ehrhardt (2013), the greater the leverage of the company, it tends to pay lower dividends in order to reduce dependence on external funding. So that the greater the proportion of debt used for the capital structure of a company, the greater the number of liabilities that are likely to affect shareholder wealth because it affects the size of the dividends to be distributed. (Yanizzar, et al. 2020)

2.3. Reconciliation

Reconciliation, according to the Big Indonesian Dictionary, is restoring friendship or resolving differences. Peace theory also describes reconciliation as a product of closure and healing. “Closing in the sense of not opening hostilities and healing in the sense of being rehabilitated” (Galtung 1998: 65). Reconciliation is an important initiative to eliminate the distrust and hatred that drives the recurrence of conflict, to achieve peace-building, and to achieve sustainable peace. John Paul Lederach from the online journal soka.ac.id explains the concept of reconciliation as follows: More specifically, reconciliation can be seen as three particular paradoxes. First, reconciliation in a general sense facilitates the encounter between the open representation of past pain on the one hand and the interdependent search for clarification of the long-term future. Second, reconciliation provides a place where truth and compassion meet. It reveals what has happened and affirms and accepts concerns about letting go in favor of a new relationship. Third, reconciliation recognizes the need to provide justice and peace, time and space to compensate for injustice and a shared vision of the future. An example of the national reconciliation process is the 1965 tragedy in Solo and Pal. Through an article entitled "Working from Margins: Initiative for Truth and Reconciliation for the Victims of Massive Violence in 1965 in Solo and Pal", 1965 Indonesian Massacre: Causes, Dynamics, Legacy (Appears in the edit of an article entitled 2018) is published. Researcher Sri Lestari Wahyuningroem analyzed two cases of changes in reconciliation strategies at the local level. Local Governments, namely the Secretariat of the Republic of Indonesia Solo and SKPHAM Buddy. When the process of reconciliation and historical correction at the national level is completed, these two initiatives improvise the search for justice at the local level.

2.4. Conflict

According to Wirawan (2016:12), disputes are one of the knowledge and skills that must be possessed by managers, including executives, managers, and bureaucrats, and all citizens are also managers of disputes and disputes. Conflict is one of the essences of life that is born from human development and has various characteristics. People have different gender, social and economic class, legal system, country, religion, belief, political sect, and
culture and purpose in life. It is these differences that have led to repeated conflicts in human history. As long as there are differences, conflict is inevitable and always occurs. Winardi (2007: 1) adds that "conflict means the antithesis or conflict between people, groups, or organizations". According to Susan (2010: 8), humans are contradictory creatures (homo conflicts), that is, a being who is constantly engaged in spontaneous and coercive differences, contradictions, and rivalries. Sociologically, conflict is defined as a social process between two or more people (which may be a group) in which one party tries to expel the other party by immobilizing the other party. Will. Conflict is motivated by differences in personal characteristics, such as physical characteristics, intelligence, knowledge, habits, beliefs, and many other differences. According to Susan (2010: 99), there are many types and levels of conflict that can be grouped according to different criteria. In general, social conflicts can be divided into two broad groups: (1) vertical conflicts or conflicts between superiors and subordinates, and (2) horizontal conflicts or conflicts between people of the same kind. Vertical conflicts are conflicts between workers and employers, between nations and citizens, or between elites and the masses (society). Elites can be central to political decision-making (government), military and corporate groups (entrepreneurs). While horizontal competition is competition that occurs within the community itself. B. Conflicts between community members, ethnic or ethnic conflicts, religious conflicts, and certain interest groups.

The dispute can be motivated by economic factors, politics, religion, power, and other interests. James (2003) mentions five types of conflict: (1) individual conflict, (2) interpersonal conflict, (3) individual conflict, and (4) group conflict. (5) Conflicts between organizations. The structure of the dispute according to Lewis A, Coser varies depending on the situation in which the dispute arises: within the group (within the group) or outside the group (outside the group). Potential for interreligious disputes and disputes between certain interest groups. The dispute can be motivated by economic factors, politics, religion, power, and other interests.

III. Research Method

The research method used is a qualitative descriptive approach, and the survey used in this study is a literature survey. The analysis is based on a library-based secondary data collection compiled from various supporting literatures from scientific journals, books, research reports, articles, and related research reports (Zed, 2004). Various types of information were collected from library sources, investigated, and the interrelationships of the data information were analyzed into complete articles.

IV. Result and Discussion

Discussion Conflict and violence have not stopped in Papua. Papua is no longer designated as a military operation area (DOM) as in the New Order era, but a series of violence was repeated during this reformation period. The conflict not only resulted in the deaths of security forces and armed groups, but also the deaths of residents. So far, the peace of mind of the Papuan people is still hampered. Several approaches to conflict resolution in Papua have failed to reduce the number of violence. The security approach adopted in the New Order era through the application of the DOM status in Papua has not resolved the problems that have arisen, but have exacerbated existing conflicts and led to various forms of violence. During the reformation period, most approaches to resolving the Papuan conflict began with the granting of special autonomy (Otsu) in the Megawati era, the establishment of a development acceleration unit in Papua during the SBY era, and in the Jokowi era. At this
stage of reform, the security approach continued to be pursued, which also resulted in the outbreak of violence.

In a series of domestic conflicts, the economic approach is inadequate to resolve long-standing conflicts. Implementing a security approach also cannot be the main basis for resolving conflicts. There are wounds and trauma due to violent conflict, and the nation must respond more wisely. Establishing a development acceleration unit in Papua during the SBY era, leading to infrastructure development in the Jokowi era. During this reform period, a security approach was also adopted, which resulted in the emergence of violence. In a series of domestic conflicts, the economic approach is inadequate to resolve long-standing conflicts. Implementing a security approach also cannot be the main basis for resolving conflicts. There are wounds and trauma due to violent conflict, and the nation must respond more wisely. Establishing a development acceleration unit in Papua during the SBY era, leading to infrastructure development in the Jokowi era. At this stage of reform, the security approach continued to be pursued, which also resulted in the outbreak of violence. In a series of domestic conflicts, the economic approach is inadequate to resolve long-standing conflicts. Implementing a security approach also cannot be the main basis for resolving conflicts. There are wounds and trauma due to violent conflict, and the nation must respond more wisely. When various state conflicts occur in this country, the economic approach is not adequate to resolve these long-term conflicts. Implementing a security approach also cannot be the main basis for resolving conflicts. There are wounds and trauma due to violent conflict, and the nation must respond more wisely. When various state conflicts occur in this country, the economic approach is not adequate to resolve these long-term conflicts. Implementing a security approach also cannot be the main basis for resolving conflicts. There are wounds and trauma due to violent conflict, and the nation must respond more wisely.

The government's view of reading the Papuan version is one of the factors that influence the choice of approach used. Governments tend to see the cause of the problem as "separatism". Differences in attitudes and behavior of several groups of Papuan people who want to withdraw from Indonesia, either by peaceful means or by armed movement, should not be viewed from one side of the issue of "separatism", especially during the period of DOM status, or as a result of experiencing violence during the reform period. You have to be aware of that. The “separatist” paradigm tends to doubt the Papuan people. The essence of the separatist paradigm tends to ignore the complexities of the roots of the Papuan conflict. In fact, according to LIPI research, Papua has four causes of conflict. First, the issue of the integration of history, status, and political identity. Second, political violence and human rights violations in Papua. Third, the failure of development. Fourth, the contradiction between the alienation of Papians and special autonomy. Komnas HAM also said that the fundamental problem in Papua is the dissatisfaction of the Papuan people towards the resolution of the issue of human rights violations by the security forces and the rampant injustice and political, economic and social discrimination experienced by the Papuan people.

In this context, the previous government's approach did not fully address the various causes of the existing conflict and did not fully understand the historical reality of the violence that occurred. The government's approach to resolving conflict was ultimately only partial and top-down policy. Indeed, within its limits, the state takes shortcuts by adopting a security approach that leads to violence. Residents have been victims of conflict in Papua several times, not once or twice. As stated by Komnas HAM, the killing of Pdt. Jeremiah Zanambani in Hitadipa, Intanjayapua, has added to the long list of civilians killed in the protracted conflict. The conflict that arose was also marked by the evacuation of Papians such as Intanjaya and Nuduga. In fact, like Intanjaya, Civilian facilities are also used as venues to support security activities such as schools. In fact, the use of private facilities to
support security activities in armed conflict is prohibited under international human rights law norms. According to Komnas HAM, Intan Jaya Papua, highly suspected of being executed by rogue defense personnel, has been added to a long list of civilians killed in the protracted conflict. The conflict was also marked by the evacuation of Papuans such as Intanjaya and Nuduga. In fact, like Intanjaya, civilian facilities are also used as places to support security activities such as schools. In fact, the use of private facilities to support security activities in armed conflict is prohibited under international human rights law norms. According to the National Human Rights Commission, Intan Jaya Papua, highly suspected of being executed by rogue defense personnel, has been added to a long list of civilians killed in the protracted conflict. The conflict that arose was also marked by the evacuation of Papuan residents such as Intanjaya and Nuduga. In fact, private facilities are also used as a place to support security activities such as schools, as happened in Intanjaya. In fact, the use of private facilities to support security activities in armed conflict is prohibited under international human rights law norms. Like a school, as happened in Intanjaya. In fact, the use of private facilities to support security activities in armed conflict is prohibited under international human rights law norms. Like a school, as happened in Intanjaya. Even though,

Disclaimer From the past until now, civilian victims in Papua have often resulted in the perpetrators going unpunished. Immunity to violent criminals is a serious problem in Papua. Meanwhile, victims continue to complain that justice has not been achieved. This is not a lack of evidence, but a lack of political will and humanitarian commitment, and the investigation into violence and human rights abuses in Papua remains unresolved. Impunity appears to be the norm in Papua. Indeed, immunity is part of the crime itself, and the government's political commitment to investigating cases of violence and human rights violations in Papua has not been maintained. No deal voted by the Truth Commission (TRC), The calculation of the politics of power is far more important than taking bold steps to advance humanity by bringing the perpetrators of violence and human rights violations to justice. Maintaining impunity results in repeated violence and restrictions on human rights in Papua. George Santayana said that countries that do not learn from the past will be punished by committing the same mistakes. Justice for victims of violence has become an expensive commodity in Papua. The lack of justice in Papua is one of the main causes of the ongoing conflict. Because of the long-running crackdown and a series of injustices, some Papuans continue to distrust the government. In fact, politics is being debated to praise and make people happy. Politics was not created to alienate people from human rights. The affirmation of human rights in the Constitution is not limited to legal norms that are easy to read, but must be manifested in real political attitudes and actions. Therefore, the responsibility for resolving cases of violence in Papua is the constitutional obligation of the country where it is carried out.

4.1. Papua Conflict Reconciliation Model and Strategy
a. Conflict Resolution

The government must find new ways to solve the Papuan problem. One of them is a dialogue approach. Comprehensive dispute resolution efforts will be facilitated if all parties are able to redefine their understanding of each other's goals and direct disputes and consider each other's goals to positively depend on each other. And regard conflict as a common problem. Conflict resolution must be based on the principles of reciprocity, equality, the fall of humanity, unity and non-violence. (Morton Deutsch and Peter T. Coleman, Conflict Resolution Handbook: Theory and Practice, 2000) Indeed, Indonesia has important political and historical capital to pave the way for a resolution of Papua through dialogue. I have experience. Of course, The first political capital is democracy growing in Indonesia. As a
democracy, the dialogue approach has a strong political foundation and motivation. Second, Indonesia has experience in resolving the conflicts in Aceh, Ambon and Poso peacefully through dialogue. The key question is, if the dialogue approach can be used elsewhere, why can’t the same approach be used for Papua? The complexity of the group's internal polarization in Papua cannot be used as an excuse to avoid or close the path of dialogue in Papuan reconciliation. Based on the Papuan human race, all parties to the Papuan conflict must rethink their shared ideas to find a way to resolve the Papuan conflict peacefully.

b. Granting Special Autonomy

The implementation of special autonomy in Papua and West Papua (Otsispapua) is based on Law No. 21 of 2001 in conjunction with Law No. 35 of 2008, and the Papuan people and the central government have been withdrawn since 1962. Retaining multifaceted disputes. Through this political compromise, the government in general does not side with the Papuans and is ready to change the various policies and development approaches of the past that have an impact on the marginalization and backwardness of the Papuan people. Increase. Accumulated by strengthening the desire to separate from the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia. For eight years the implementation of Otsus Papua has not shown the maximum results expected by all parties, consistently by the central government, provincial government, district/city governments, and all levels including the TNI and Polri. This gives the impression of not having a strong commitment. Carry out the obligations of the Special Autonomy Law effectively, honestly and thoroughly. Some central government policies are believed to reject the consequences of compromise. If the government or state administrators, including provinces or districts/cities, are serious about fulfilling the obligations of the Special Autonomy Law.

1. Opportunity

Coincidence Basically, Papua's Special Autonomy is a solution to Papua's past, present and future problems which are essentially multidimensional in nature. Therefore, the Special Autonomy Law for Papua is the formal legal basis for the state to give special authority to the government and people of Papua and West Papua, as well as to provide various sources of funding for Papua. I have an obligation. It is governed by two states and Articles 34-34. 36 The Papuan Special Autonomy Law actually provides an opportunity for the government and the people of Papua and West Papua to inspire the process. Various fields, both physical and non-physical. (2) Improving the quality of government administration and public services.

2. Challenge

Otsus Papua will have a bleak prospect and will not be able to become a means of solving problems and antidote to various conflicts in Papua, as well as being a means to achieve a useful life for Papuans in the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia if: (1) Central and Regional Governments can change the paradigm development in Papua, which has so far been oriented towards a security approach, has become an approach that is focused on achieving prosperity in accordance with the objectives of Otsus. (2) Stop and resolve all forms of human rights violations in Papua, including if past human rights violations failed to be resolved in a fair and dignified manner, (3) Increase the capacity and integrity of the Papuan government in accordance with the spirit and mandate of Law no. 21 of 2001 provides an opportunity to create change for the improvement of various aspects of the life of the Papuan people and the realignment of government in Papua. (4) The provincial and district/city governments disseminate/deliver various information regarding the use of the special autonomy fund budget to the lowest level. Information disseminated must be in accordance with reality. (5) Law enforcement against state administrators (bureaucrats and
members of the DPR at the provincial and district/city levels) in Papua who abuse their positions. Information disseminated must be in accordance with reality. (5) Prosecution of Papuan state officials (state and district/city level bureaucrats and members of the DPR) who abuse their positions. Information disseminated must be in accordance with reality.

3. Future Hope

It is hoped that the Special Autonomy Law in Papua and West Papua will allow the government to correct and correct past mistakes and weaknesses so that the Papuan people enjoy a better, more advanced atmosphere and are treated fairly and with dignity. This is a solid legal basis for doing so. One atmosphere of life. Safe and fearless. Therefore, with proper optimization of Otsusu and its effective use, various provisions for the implementation of the Special Autonomy Law, namely the availability of Perdasus and Perdasi, as well as the readiness of Papua's special autonomous bodies, namely states and districts. Seriousness is required. Support from various sections of the city government (DPRP, DPRD) and Papuan civil society, including the MRP.

c. Settlement of the Papua Conflict using the Papua Road Map (PRM) Model

The team formed by the Indonesian Institute of Sciences (LIPI) led by Dr. S. Widjojo's student has developed a basic and comprehensive dispute resolution model in Papua. The Papuan Conflict Resolution Model is set out in the form of a 36-page paper which they call the Papua Roadmap. Dr. Disciple S. Widjojo, the coordinator of this team, is a young Indonesian intellectual who understands the root causes of the conflict in Papua. His postgraduate and doctoral studies studied Papuan social movements and Marc. From 2004 to 2006, the LIPI team investigated the Papuan conflict in Papua and it was written in three monographs (theses). First, the roles and interests of actors in the conflict in Papua (2004). Second, the agenda and potential for peace in Papua (2005), and third, trust building and reconciliation in Papua (2006). The findings above are to design a model that was created through interviews, discussions, seminars and workshops in Jakarta and Jayapura, using various sources from individuals, government agencies and civil society. Used as the first reference, the LIPI team also held a seminar (31/07) in Jakarta. Participants represented key elements from government agencies such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Vice President, retired TNI officials with an interest in human rights, and NGOs. Participants in Papua included Papuan Council officials, church leaders, and human rights activists in Papua. Dissemination of the Papua Roadmap through seminars, discussions, workshops and other forums ensures that decision makers and non-governmental activists from various state institutions in Jakarta have comprehensive and complete insights on Papuan issues. The goal is to get it. Conflict. On the one hand, this insight is expected to ease the political positions and attitudes of Jakarta's political elite, particularly the DPRRI and the central government. Meanwhile, the strategic elite

Papuans have shown goodwill to take new steps towards resolving the Papuan issue, both in local and non-governmental organizations. The LIPI team found that there are two extreme poles that highlight their interests and agendas. The ultra-nationalist pole of Indonesia carries the agenda of "NKRI with a fixed price", and the other pole is the Papuan nationalist who carries a fixed price of "M". "Historical contradictions and differences in the construction of Papuan and Indonesian political identities between Papua and Jakarta between Papua and Jakarta, if not managed properly, are fundamental, inclusive, peaceful and just. When a dignified solution model is sought, one interesting approach that is interactive and dignified will continue to cause conflict with others. As a result, the nation's development and the lives of Indonesian people face obstacles. Based on the above investigation, the LIPI
team grouped and mapped the causes of the Papuan conflict into four key themes: First, the issue of economic development from 1970 to the present, political conflicts, and the impact of alienation and discrimination against indigenous Papuans due to mass migration to Papua. Second, the failure of development, especially in the fields of education, health and economic empowerment of the population. Third, there are historical contradictions and the construction of identity politics between Papua and Jakarta. Fourth, accountability for past national violence against Indonesian citizens in Papua. To answer the four questions above, the LIPI team has also developed four major agendas as political decisions or work agendas that can be adopted by national and international institutions and the community for the resolution of the Papuan conflict.

At the end of the four major issues of the Papuan conflict raised, of course there are problems with the ideology of Indonesian nationalism and relations with Indonesian representatives in Papua. So far, Indonesia has existed and is understood by indigenous Papuans in the form of the arrival of migrants from outside Papua and the alienation of Papuans. In rural and urban areas, representatives of Indonesia are not present as civil servants in the fields of good health and education, but are more dominant in the form of military posts, military operations and violence against indigenous Papuans. Disclosure of Indonesian identity is also understood by changing the place of residence and utilizing Papua's natural resources without compensation in the form of welfare and prosperity for indigenous Papuans. In the end, Indonesianism is subjectively regarded as the opposite of Papuanism, namely anything that curbs and harms the interests and original identity of the Papuan people. The form of Indonesian nationalism in Papua is dominated by symbolic interpretations and practices with a militaristic perspective. Nationalism experiences a reduction in meaning and superficiality compared to the red and white flag symbol, the national anthem, or other symbols. Because of the strength of symbolic nationalism, the symbolic resistance of the Papuan people is too muted by the Morning Star flag, the song Hai Tanahku Papua, or other symbols, and these symbols of resistance are for their owners. It will be more holy. That is, everything that curbs and undermines the interests and original identity of the Papuan people. The form of Indonesian nationalism in Papua is dominated by symbolic interpretations and practices with a militaristic perspective. Nationalism has decreased in meaning and silent respect for the red and white flag symbol, the national anthem, or other symbols. Because of the strength of symbolic nationalism, the symbolic resistance of the Papuan people is too suppressed by the use of the Morning Star flag, the song Haitanak Papua, or other symbols, making the symbol of resistance even more sacred by its owner. I will make it. That is, everything that curbs and undermines the interests and original identity of the Papuan people. The form of Indonesian nationalism in Papua is dominated by symbolic interpretations and practices with a militaristic perspective. Nationalism has decreased in meaning and silent respect for the red and white flag symbol, the national anthem, or other symbols. Because of the strength of symbolic nationalism, the symbolic resistance of the Papuan people is too muted by the Morning Star flag, the song Hai Tanahku Papua, or other symbols, making these symbols of resistance to their owners. Makes it more holy. Nationalism has decreased in meaning and silent respect for the red and white flag symbol, the national anthem, or other symbols.

Due to the strength of symbolic nationalism, the symbolic resistance of the Papuan people is too suppressed by the Morning Star flag, the song Hai Tanahku Papua, or other symbols, turning these symbols of resistance into their owners. Makes it more holy. Symbolic resistance must be understood as a game of meaning and as an expression of socio-political, economic and cultural reality. The symbol couldn't possibly be killed by the physical suppression of its owner. Symbols must confront the wits of the play of meaning and the
increasing social realities that undermine or promote these symbols. The symbols and meanings of Indonesianism and Papanism which were strong ideally at that time were the result of a lasting and solid social construction if social reality did not change. Two groups of "two" Iconic nationalism that is currently facing each other may complement each other if the foundations and roots of social and political realities change. The face of Indonesia and Papuanism can change once the four agendas are recognized, seriously taking a new paradigm of development dialogue and reconciliation and representing the new dominant Indonesia in Papua. The Indonesian nation can exist as a concrete manifestation of prosperity, guarantee a sense of justice, peace and optimism, and provide a comfortable space for the Papuan people.

V. Conclusion

The conflict in Papua is a vertical conflict, namely the conflict between the Indonesian government and the Papuan people. However, in the reconciliation process, many stakeholders are involved in negotiating the Papuan conflict both domestically and abroad, related to their respective roles in Papua peace building. The internal negotiation process involves officials from the government (central and regional), OPM, traditional and religious leaders, as well as members of the TNI/Polri who have been given a special mission to maintain the security of Papua. The government is expected to respond quickly to the demands of the Papuan conflict by conducting dialogue between Jakarta and Papua to form mutually beneficial agreements. What the government can do to resolve the Papua dispute is to use the first PRM model (Papua Roadmap), Second Conflict Reconciliation, and the third is the Granting of Special Autonomy. These three concepts must be linked to the cultural values of the Papuan people and must not use a military or violent approach. If the Government of Indonesia succeeds in protecting Papua within the framework of the unitary state of the Republic of Indonesia, the Government of Indonesia will eventually declare its legitimacy in Papua.

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Stephanie K. Marrus, quoted by Sukristono (200131)
